Abstract
The mission of the Navy, as written in its founding documents, “is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas”. Because of recent court litigation regarding the use of its SURTASS LFA SONAR system and its potential harm on marine mammals or cetaceans, the Navy has had to scale back its anti-submarine warfare program, which has had devastating effects on its training programs. The following article addresses the reasons why this is harmful not only for protecting our country, but for maintaining our dominance as the largest and most powerful Navy in the world.


History of the Navy and its Submarine Program

In 1781 President George Washington said that "It follows than as certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable and glorious.” It is with this spirit that our Navy continues to be strong, innovative and still willing to serve the United States so that we can maintain our freedom. During the first and second World War and the Cold War that followed public support for the Navy’s anti-submarine warfare program was high because of the threat of the inventors of the first submarine, the Germans; and then later the Communist Russian Government. During this time period America’s greatest priority was defense and protection of its citizens. After the Cold War ended, the Navy reprioritized their concerns, and found that other programs, like anti-surface warfare, were more detrimental to their success in defending the country. During this time of relative peace for our country however, the rest of the world continued to develop their arsenal of submarines. Our focus again shifted to defense after the terrorist attacks after September 11, 2001. The main concern of our nation’s leaders was keeping its citizens and assets safe from un-allied countries, no matter what the cost. In this case the cost has been the safety of whales.

Submarines and SONAR Today

Because of America’s recent focus on military operations, concerned citizens have become more aware of how the military, specifically the Navy, conduct their training exercises. Many environmentalists are concerned about how SURTASS LFA, the Navy’s combination active and passive SONAR system, has affected the marine wildlife, specifically cetaceans (marine mammals including dolphins, porpoises, and whales) during anti-submarine warfare training exercises. They are concerned that the low-frequency active aspect of the SONAR system, which sends out pings to measure the distance from the originator an object, may interact with and distorts the cetaceans natural SONAR. Because of this there have been some recent court cases that have attempted to restrict the use of the Navy’s active SONAR system in certain areas that cetaceans frequent. It is the position of the Navy and the Government that national defense must remain the first priority for the following reasons:
1. To protect the United States from the 224 submarines that are operated by non allied nations
2. To allow for realistic training situations in the littoral waters of the United States.

For many not familiar with anti-submarine warfare and think that it is “over”, it did not end with the Cold War. In 2008 of the 500 non-US submarines, 224 are operated by non-allied nations including 135 in Asia and 45 in the Middle East. The Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of Chile have publically declared that the submarine is the flagship of their Navies. Iran and North Korea have said this also, except not so officially (Vego 1). Most of these countries are also converting their sub fleets from the loud nuclear variety to a new quieter diesel technology that can sit on the bottom of the ocean for up to two weeks with out being detected. Passive SONAR is not able to “hear” these newer, quieter submarines because they do not make enough noise for the hydrophones to pick up.

What the Navy Thinks

The Navy’s viewpoint on the matter of SONAR potentially hurting whales was made very clear in testimony before a House subcommittee on fisheries conservation. During this testimony on October 11, 2001, Vice-Admiral Dennis V. McGinn, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, discusses this viewpoint. His most convincing argument is that “The Navy has an immediate, critical need for SURTASS LFA. By law, the Navy's primary mission is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas. Antisubmarine warfare, or ASW, is a critical part of that mission. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has stated that ASW is essential to sea control and maritime dominance. Many nations throughout the world can employ submarines to deny access to forward regions or to significantly delay the execution of crucial Navy operations. Because of its inherent stealth, lethality, and affordability, the submarine is a powerful threat” (McGinn) It is also important to note that Vice-Admiral McGinn considers himself and every other member of the Navy to be stewards of the ocean, but their ability to work around protection laws are not infinite. He was saying this eight years ago and it still holds true today. In 2008 the Supreme Court decided that the Navy’s goals of protecting the United States overrode environmentalists concern for whales—for now.

Why Realistic Training is Necessary

One of the biggest aspects of the SONAR controversy is where the Navy has decided to conduct their training exercises. Most of the conflict is in the San Diego Bay area which happens to be home to the second largest Naval base in the Pacific and also home to a great number of cetaceans that live there all year round or pass through on their way from northern regions to the warm waters of Mexico. The littoral, or coastal, areas of Southern California are appropriate for antisubmarine training because of the unique underwater terrain that enemy subs could easily hide in. The misconception about antisubmarine warfare is that it is conducted in the open ocean, while the truth is that the most risk from subs is in the coastal areas where it is easier to hide and to possibly deploy divers for terrorist missions. Another incorrect assumption of environmental groups is that “real-life” training can be replaced by simulated, computerized training. While simulated training is very prominent in the Navy, SONAR technicians must be able to learn and practice in a realistic environments. For example you would not expect an Air Traffic Controller on an aircraft carrier to only be trained at a typical airport. When the job has high steaks the training usually does too.
The most recent lawsuit, which went all the way to the Supreme Court, was brought forth by Natural Resources Defense Council placed an injunction on all Naval peacetime training operations that did not follow an addition 29 mitigation (or cessation) procedures on top of the procedures that the Navy had in place. In the “Southern California exercise area if whales or dolphins are spotted within 2,000 meters of its source, unless the exercise is at a critical point. The injunction also barred the use of sonar within 12 nautical miles of shore and expressly prohibited it in the Catalina basin, an area between Santa Catalina Island and San Clemente Island that provides rich foraging for animals such as blue and grey whales and is considered a prime anti-submarine warfare training ground by the Navy for its unique undersea terrain” (Kime, 36). This is just one of the guidelines the Navy has been forced to follow with worrisome results.

Repercussions of Training Limitations

Not only have restrictions been placed on the San Diego Bay area they were also restricted in Hawaii, home of the headquarters of the Pacific Naval Fleet. These restrictions, according to Rear Admiral Lawrence Rice, the Director of the Chief of Naval Operations and Environmental Readiness Division, in 2008, “training restrictions in Hawaii caused one ship of five in a carrier strike group to deploy to the Far East [with] untrained [SONAR operators]. The screen commander was faced with deciding whether all the crews should get half the training or one of the five not get any. He chose the lesser of two evils” (Kine 39). The fact that a branch of our government would allow one of our military service personnel to deploy with training because of whale safety is absolutely irresponsible and terrifying. Why isn’t there public outrage over putting thousands of troops at risk because their SONAR operator never learned how to use their equipment?

Conclusions

It is clear to many, including the Supreme Court, that using the SURTASS LFA SONAR system for the preservation of America’s naval dominance along with the protection of our country outweighs the potential health risks of cetaceans. The Navy, while relieved that they can begin to train with fewer restrictions is aware that they are impacting an environment they hold dear. As Rear Admiral Rice told a reporter, “One of the greatest things about being a carrier [commanding officer] is seeing all the marine life out there. To think we’re out there trying to kill everything in our second home just isn’t true” (Kine 36). The Navy continues to be the single largest funder of Marine Biology Research in the world. They have funded over fifty percent of it and have spent between $17 and 20 million annually since 2003. The key to this controversy is balance. The environmental groups must realize that these training exercises are a necessary component to our national security, and the Navy must continue to research new technologies that are safe for all marine wildlife.